Summary
Academic equity factor models have excluded Financial Services since Fama and French (1992). Our flagship Systematic 50s follow the same rule by default.
We tested whether that exclusion still holds across twenty years of U.S. data (2006 to 2026). We ran our full 2×2 matrix (Small-Cap vs. Mid-Cap, Value vs. Quality) twice. The first run used 4,888 non-financial stocks. The second added roughly 2,000 banks, insurers, and lenders (6,873 stocks in total).
Three clear findings stand out:
- Small-Cap Value 50 barely changes in return, but shifts in risk. Full-sample CAGR is virtually identical (20.6% Ex-Financials vs. 20.6% Inc-Financials). Adding Financials nudges volatility up (30.9% to 31.5%), deepens max drawdown (-67.4% to -68.0%), and tilts the portfolio toward lower profitability (
RMWdrops from+0.03to-0.13). - Mid-Cap Value 50 benefits the most from Financials. In the liquid
$500M+universe, adding Financials lifts 20-year CAGR from 7.2% to 10.8% (Sharpe 0.33 to 0.44) and nearly doubles HML Value exposure (+0.43 to +0.80). The trade-off is higher volatility (28.7% to 30.4%) and acute banking drawdowns (-24.6% during Spring 2023 regional bank stress). - Quality (ROE) screens see limited upside. Regulated banks and insurers rarely match the high ROEs of asset-light non-financial firms. Small-Cap Quality 50 actually performs better without Financials (13.6% vs. 12.2%, Sharpe 0.55 vs. 0.51). Mid-Cap Quality gains a modest +1.2% a year (
4.1%to5.3%).
Why Financials Behave Differently in Accounting Screens
For an industrial or software company, debt is a financing choice. Book equity reflects retained operating capital. For a bank or insurer, liabilities such as deposits and policy reserves are the core operating product. Financial balance sheets routinely run at 8× to 15× assets-to-equity.
Mixing both balance-sheet types in one rank creates two structural effects:
- Low Price-to-Book concentrates banking exposure. Banks and insurers naturally trade closer to book value than asset-light businesses. In a
$500M+mid-cap universe where fewer deep-value industrial stocks exist, Financials expand the opportunity set and push HML Value beta much higher. During banking crises, however, correlated credit risk hits all at once. - High leverage caps ROE rank. A bank earning a
1.1%return on assets at12×leverage reports a13.2%ROE. That sits well below top-decile asset-light non-financials. As a result, Financials cluster heavily in Value (P/B) screens rather than Quality (ROE) screens.
20-Year Results Across the 2×2 Matrix (2006–2026)
Every portfolio uses identical rules: March and September rebalances, a 60-day SEC filing lag, two years of post-IPO history, liquidity filters, and equal 2% starting weights across 50 stocks.
| Strategy (2006–2026) | Universe | Ann. Return | Ann. Vol | Sharpe | Max DD | FF5 R² | HML (Value) β | SMB (Size) β |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Small-Cap Value 50 | Ex-Financials | 20.6% | 30.9% | 0.71 | -67.4% | 0.81 | +0.55 | +1.06 |
| Small-Cap Value 50 | Inc-Financials | 20.6% | 31.5% | 0.70 | -68.0% | 0.82 | +0.74 | +0.93 |
| Mid-Cap Value 50 | Ex-Financials | 7.2% | 28.7% | 0.33 | -61.8% | 0.88 | +0.43 | +0.97 |
| Mid-Cap Value 50 | Inc-Financials | 10.8% | 30.4% | 0.44 | -64.2% | 0.90 | +0.80 | +0.76 |
| Small-Cap Quality 50 | Ex-Financials | 13.6% | 26.8% | 0.55 | -62.4% | 0.83 | +0.00 | +0.92 |
| Small-Cap Quality 50 | Inc-Financials | 12.2% | 26.3% | 0.51 | -64.0% | 0.85 | +0.03 | +0.83 |
| Mid-Cap Quality 50 | Ex-Financials | 4.1% | 25.3% | 0.22 | -60.5% | 0.90 | +0.06 | +0.86 |
| Mid-Cap Quality 50 | Inc-Financials | 5.3% | 25.1% | 0.26 | -60.8% | 0.91 | +0.11 | +0.74 |
Factor Attribution Shift
In both Value portfolios, adding Financials reduces Size (SMB) beta and sharply increases Value (HML) beta. In Mid-Cap Value 50, HML jumps from +0.43 to +0.80, while SMB falls from +0.97 to +0.76. Five-factor R² stays high (0.82 to 0.91) across all four strategies once corporate-action data glitches are cleaned.
Decade Split: 2006–2015 vs. 2016–2026
Splitting the sample into two decades shows how consistent the pattern is across market regimes.
| Strategy | 2006–2015 CAGR (Ex vs Inc) | 2006–2015 Sharpe (Ex vs Inc) | 2016–2026 CAGR (Ex vs Inc) | 2016–2026 Sharpe (Ex vs Inc) | 2023 Bank Stress DD (Inc) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Small-Cap Value 50 | 16.6% vs 16.5% | 0.63 vs 0.60 | 24.5% vs 24.5% | 0.78 vs 0.79 | -19.4% |
| Mid-Cap Value 50 | 4.9% vs 7.3% | 0.27 vs 0.35 | 9.4% vs 14.2% | 0.38 vs 0.52 | -24.6% |
| Small-Cap Quality 50 | 8.4% vs 9.4% | 0.40 vs 0.43 | 18.8% vs 15.0% | 0.69 vs 0.58 | -18.8% |
| Mid-Cap Quality 50 | 4.1% vs 5.1% | 0.24 vs 0.28 | 4.3% vs 5.6% | 0.20 vs 0.25 | -17.9% |
- Small-Cap Value 50 delivers nearly identical returns in both decades (
16.6% vs 16.5%and24.5% vs 24.5%). Excluding Financials gives the same long-term return with slightly lower volatility and no banking-crisis concentration. - Mid-Cap Value 50 improves in both decades when Financials are included, especially from 2016 to 2026 (
14.2%vs.9.4%, Sharpe0.52vs.0.38). Even post-Dodd-Frank, however, regional bank failures in Spring 2023 triggered a -24.6% drawdown in three months. - Small-Cap Quality 50 loses ground in the modern decade when Financials are included (
15.0%vs.18.8%).
Practical Conclusion
- Ex-Financials stays the cleaner default for Small-Cap strategies. It matches Small-Cap Value’s 20-year return with lower volatility and outperforms in Small-Cap Quality.
- Mid-Cap Value is the one tier where Financials add clear value. Raising the market-cap floor to
$500M+shrinks the non-financial deep-value pool, so adding banks and insurers materially broadens the screen (+3.7%CAGR over 20 years). - Manage sector concentration if you include Financials. Any custom Including-Financials Value portfolio should pair the screen with a sector cap (for example, 20% to 25% max Financials) to limit drawdowns during banking stress.
Methodology note: Both runs use point-in-time FMP quarterly fundamentals and dividend-adjusted daily prices (2005 to 2026), regressed on Kenneth French daily U.S. 5-factor data. Price series are audited for multi-week trading halts, unadjusted splits, and Chapter 11 ticker reuses (such as CIT Group in December 2009) so cancelled bankrupt equities are never stitched into re-listed shares. Results are gross of costs and taxes and are for research only.